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Executive Summary
The Internet has enabled global communication and collaboration on an
unprecedented scale. It has also become an incredibly effective means for
distributing harmful content, engaging in harmful behaviors, and coordinating
harmful acts. Some of these online harms exacerbate preexisting offline
harms—like the distribution of child sexual abuse material—while others are
relatively unique to the internet, like the ability to launch mass anonymous
harassment campaigns, which disproportionately target women and people of
color.1
In the United States, targeted online disinformation campaigns during recent
election cycles have super-charged calls for a comprehensive approach to
addressing harms online.2 The focus of these conversations has largely fallen on
the small group of companies operating the most-visible content distribution
platforms, namely Facebook, Twitter, and Google (primarily in its role as
YouTube’s parent company). 3 But Facebook is not the internet, and focusing
almost exclusively on the companies behind these high-profile social media
platforms means that the majority of the internet is often left out of the
conversation about how to effectively combat harmful content online while also
protecting fundamental rights and civil liberties.
This report engages in that larger conversation by discussing the full internet
ecosystem’s role in generating, curating, and disseminating online content. We
begin by introducing several case studies that illustrate the ways in which
companies throughout the internet have taken action to deny services to specific
actors or stem the tide of particular content, with varying degrees of success. We
then propose a mapping of what we call the online information ecosystem:
the full range of functions and services collectively enabling users to
disseminate and consume content online. Finally, using this mapping as a
framework, we examine the primary technical and contractual mechanisms
available throughout the ecosystem to moderate online content.
Importantly, the goal of this paper is descriptive, not prescriptive. In order to
have a nuanced and robust conversation about the roles, responsibilities, and
decision-making of actors throughout the internet ecosystem in addressing
harmful content online, it is necessary to first reach a common understanding
about what is possible. This report is intended to provide a diverse range of
audiences with a working understanding of the online information ecosystem’s
collective role in the generation and dissemination of content online.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to first and foremost thank Jennifer
Daskal, without whom this project never would have been possible—during her
time as faculty director of the Tech, Law & Security Program, she not only
conceptualized this project but was the driving force behind it—as well as TLS
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program director Gary Corn, whose support, insight, and guidance has been
essential to its continuation. The authors would also like to thank the many
individuals, who shall remain anonymous, who participated in multiple private
roundtables on this issue set. Finally, the authors would like to thank Gary Corn,
Corin Stone, Paul Rosenzweig, Bill Woodcock, Laura Draper, and Blake Reid for
their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any errors are solely attributable
to the authors.
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Introduction
On January 6, 2021, the United States witnessed an unprecedented attack on the
U.S. Capitol building during a joint session of Congress, resulting in several
deaths. 4 Parler—a social media platform where scores of participants in the
Capitol riot had connected, organized, and posted live video footage of the
attack—soon became the subject of intense public scrutiny. 5 Within the
following forty-eight hours, Google Play and the Apple App Store had both
announced that they would be suspending downloads of the Parler mobile
application. 6 One day later, Amazon Web Services similarly confirmed that it
would stop providing cloud hosting to Parler, temporarily forcing the platform’s
operational back-end offline.7
This was not the first—nor will it be the last—time that internet companies
beyond the major social media platforms have taken voluntary action to limit
the accessibility of specific content online. In October 2020, a website hosting
service stopped providing services to the all-male, self-styled “Western
chauvinists” known as Proud Boys, following pressure from Google.8 Just one
year earlier, on August 3, 2019, a user posted “a manifesto decrying a ‘Hispanic
invasion of Texas’” on 8chan, a website and messaging service widely known as
a place where white extremists congregate online. 9 Hours later, a gunman
presumed to be the author of the manifesto10 opened fire in a crowded shopping
mall in El Paso, killing 22 unarmed men, women, and children, and injuring
another 24. 11 8chan had already been tied to other hate-motivated killings,
including the March 2019 Christchurch massacre targeting two New Zealand
mosques and the fatal San Diego synagogue attack that same spring.12 Still, it
wasn’t until the aftermath of the El Paso shooting that Cloudflare, a company
that sells content delivery services, terminated its services to 8chan. 13 Four
years prior, Cloudflare—along with content hosting company Digital Ocean,
Google, and GoDaddy, one of the web’s largest domain name registrars—had
also stopped providing services to the Daily Stormer, one of the then-most
popular neo-Nazi websites on the internet, following intense public pressure.14
Like 8chan, the Daily Stormer struggled to find and retain new online service
providers, bouncing between the dark and clear web—described by journalist
Talia Lavin as “wander[ing] the digital wilderness.”15 In 2010, a similar series of
termination decisions by web hosting providers and payment processors
temporarily forced WikiLeaks offline in the wake of U.S. government pressure
over WikiLeaks’ publication of classified documents, courtesy of U.S. Army
Specialist Chelsea Manning.16
These actions highlight the under-discussed roles that companies across the
internet ecosystem play in delivering content to users and, by extension, their
ability to moderate that process. While debates rage about the roles and
responsibilities of the major social media platforms in addressing the
distribution of harmful content online, there is far less attention paid to the roles
1

and responsibilities of other companies across the internet ecosystem that are
also essential to the generation and distribution of online content.17
We seek to widen the lens beyond the content dissemination functions that have
thus far dominated these discussions. Who is responsible for addressing
concerns arising from the vast universe of content that exists online beyond the
social media platforms—the proverbial last mile of the content distribution
ecosystem? What happens when social media companies fail to respond to—or
themselves explicitly promulgate—violence, fraud, and a range of other harms?
At what point is it the responsibility of the numerous other companies that
comprise the online information ecosystem to take action? Using what methods?
According to what substantive and procedural standards? And what are the
potential collateral costs—to freedom of speech, to security, and to privacy—of
doing so?
This report is part one of a larger project seeking to answer these questions—
issues that are critical to the ongoing efforts to respond to an array of harms
being perpetuated online. What types of content and harms merit a response is,
of course, a source of constant debate. 18 For the purposes of this particular
paper, we are leaving that debate to the side. Our focus here is on describing the
mechanisms used by companies across the online information ecosystem to
address whatever falls into the bucket of agreed-upon, need-to-be addressed
harms.
Examining the full range of companies that comprise the internet’s content
generation, storage, and delivery ecosystem—and the various ways they engage
with and manage that content—is necessary to ensure truly robust public
debate on a diverse set of urgent issues. As noted above, this report is intended
to provide a range of audiences with a working understanding of the online
information ecosystem’s collective role in the generation and dissemination of
content online. By necessity, we do not capture every nuance of internet
architecture here, though we have done our best to not sacrifice accuracy for
accessibility. We also hope our endnotes highlight ample additional resources.
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Moderation Beyond Platforms: 8chan
From 2013 to 2019, 8chan gained popularity as an online gathering place for
white supremacists, conspiracy theorists, and self-styled trolls.19 While 8chan’s
terms of use nominally restricted posting, requesting, or linking to “any content
that is illegal in the United States of America,” violent and extremist content
went largely unmoderated. 20 Like most websites, 8chan relies upon a web of
online service providers to remain accessible to users.
In March 2019, a mass shooting at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand,
was livestreamed on Facebook.21 Facebook did not remove the livestream until
after it had ended, at which point the footage at already made the jump over to
independently hosted platforms, including 8chan.22 In response, major Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) in New Zealand and Australia took the dramatic step
of blocking country-wide access to 8chan, as well as to several other sites that
were hosting the footage.23
In August 2019, yet another mass shooter took to 8chan24 – this time posting a
racist manifesto before opening fire in a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, killing 22
people. 25 The next day, content distribution network provider Cloudflare
ceased providing services to 8chan. 26 The site temporarily found a new CDN
provider, until that service provider’s parent company pulled its support as
well.27 Tucows, the world’s second-largest domain registrar, also cut ties with
8chan, disrupting traffic to the 8chan.com domain.28 8chan ultimately survived,
rebranding as 8kun.top, though the reach of its content and its accessibility to
potential new users have been restricted by mainstream service providers’
refusal to associate with the site.29
The lifecycle of 8chan illustrates not only the potential impact that companies
throughout the internet ecosystem can have on the accessibility of harmful
content—it also highlights the overwhelmingly ad-hoc and reactionary bases
upon which these decisions have largely been made. While ISPs took action
against 8chan in New Zealand and Australia, those same companies took no
action against much larger platforms like Facebook, where hundreds of
thousands of duplicate or slightly-altered versions of the footage were uploaded
in the hours following the attack. 30 ISPs cited the large platforms’ ongoing
removal efforts as justification, yet blocked several smaller websites found to be
hosting the footage that were also actively working to remove the content.31 And
although Cloudflare and Tucows ultimately also took action against 8chan, both
companies expressed extreme reluctance both before and after doing so, with
Cloudflare in particular citing the lack of clear independent standards to guide
their decision-making as a cause for concern.32
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Moderation Beyond Platforms: Covid-19
False information about coronavirus treatments has been a persistent problem
during the Covid-19 pandemic. Authoritarian governments have used the
pandemic as a reason—in many cases illegitimately—to crack down on the
spread of “false information” within their borders.33 Another key issue has been
the spread of false coronavirus treatment information through traditional
media, such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s dangerous suggestion in an
April 2020 press briefing that individuals inject disinfectants to treat the virus.34
Yet the spread of false information about Covid-19 treatments online has been
a persistent problem far beyond traditional media and high-profile social media
platforms, and companies across the online information ecosystem have taken
action to limit its dissemination—including within the Domain Name System
(DNS).
In April 2020, the United Kingdom’s domain name registry Nominet (the
official registry for .uk domain names) began screening coronavirus-related
websites by default when they were registered with the company; only once the
website was deemed legitimate would the domain name be usable. Nominet said
in April 2020 that this had already led to the suspension of over 600
coronavirus-related domain names under its umbrella. “We don’t want to
prevent legitimate registration from getting through, but I think the current
situation warrants further checks at the point of registration,” Nominet’s
managing director of registry services told ZDNet.35
Also in April 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a disruption
of hundreds of online scams related to the coronavirus “without requiring legal
processes.” 36 The DOJ said it worked directly with domain registries and
registrars, passing along complaints about domains that hosted false
information or were even selling fake vaccines and fake cures. It also passed
along the names of domains that were hosting malware or that operated
fraudulent charities purporting to help address the coronavirus. Many of these
domain registries and registrars, the DOJ said, then reviewed the domains, found
them to be in violation of their policies, and took down the domains
voluntarily. 37 The DOJ itself received these leads from industry and was also
using new industry tools to detect new domains that hosted false Covid-19
information and other scams. 38 It did not specify how the takedowns were
technically carried out, and it did not name any specific domain registrars or
registries involved. 39 Quad9, a public recursive DNS resolver, independently
monitored malicious Covid-specific domain sets and blocked access attempts.
Companies across the DNS have a variety of levers at their disposal to limit
access to online content, described in greater detail below. These actions taken
to limit the spread of Covid-19 false information help illustrate how these levers
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can be deployed relatively selectively, or relatively broadly, to limit the
accessibility of online content and services to internet users globally.40

Mapping the Ecosystem: How Content Moves Online
When using the internet in our daily lives, we rarely think about all of the steps
that it takes for content to travel from another device to our own screens, and
all of the parties involved in making that exchange of information possible.
When we post on Facebook, for example, the only obvious parties to that
transaction are our own devices (and by extension, the companies that produce
them), the company providing our internet connection, and Facebook itself. But
even sharing such a simple piece of content online requires a number of other
critical actors whose role in the distribution of content throughout the internet
ecosystem is oftentimes overlooked. Without these many parties—and in the
age of a privatized internet, these organizations are in large part private
companies—the poster would never make it online, the post would not get to
the right place, and it certainly would not be accessible to others, whether half a
mile away or halfway around the world.
Echoing but diverging slightly from traditional, more abstracted models of the
internet protocol “stack”,41 the mapping we propose is intended to provide a
framework for discussing how content is distributed throughout the internet
ecosystem by identifiably involved actors. As with any modeling exercise, this
mapping seeks to provide workable categories, thus eliding the full set of
complexities. It is not, as a result, exhaustive. It also is not the only way to
categorize or describe the practical functions carried out,42 and it is critical to
note that:
•
•
•

certain functions often overlap;
certain companies fall into multiple service provider categories; and,
increasingly, related functions are often bundled together and
presented as a single service.

What this mapping offers is a model that sheds light on the broad spectrum of
functional roles played by companies throughout the online information
ecosystem, all of which, to varying degrees, enable users to share or access
content on their devices:
Accessing: This is the part of the online information ecosystem that
connects devices (like computers and phones) to the online world, via
a combination of wires, cables, servers, routers, and more. Internet
service providers (ISPs) like AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, and Vodaphone
all operate in this space. It also includes Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs) like Tor, which enable users to access the internet in ways that
mask location and are thus often utilized to evade local content
5

controls.
Delivering: This part of the ecosystem routes internet traffic from
users to sought-after content (such as websites, streaming videos, and
apps) and back again. It includes the registries, registrars, and
Domain Name System operators that effectively create and operate a
phone book for the internet, the range of content delivery networks
like Cloudflare and Akamai that allow content publishers to scale to
meet user demand, and an array of other private and quasigovernmental actors that help deliver traffic along routes from point A
to point B.
Hosting and securing: Hosting services provide a place for content to
sit and business logic to be executed. This includes cloud providers
like Microsoft, Google, and Amazon and website hosting platforms
like Bluehost. DDoS mitigation services protect hosting services, and
the servers that such hosting services use, by filtering attacks on the
system. Cloudflare, Verisign, and Amazon (AWS Shield) are among the
companies providing these services. Increasingly, hosting and DDoS
mitigation services are offered by the same providers, though key
companies operating in this part of the ecosystem, such as Cloudflare,
do not offer web hosting services.43
Browsing: Web browsers, like Google Chrome, Safari, and Firefox,
provide the digital gateway to accessing public-facing content on the
public internet as well as on the “dark web.”
Content-curating: Content curation is the user-interfacing part of the
ecosystem that has as its core the aggregation and curation of content
online. We use the term “curation” here broadly to include both
algorithmic and human curation that ranks, sorts, prioritizes, suggests,
or otherwise filters content. This comes in a variety of forms, including
platforms, search engines, app stores, and a range of other entities that
enable or support user-generated content.
Platforms — Social platforms including Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, Instagram, Reddit, and TikTok and online
marketplaces like Amazon, Airbnb, and Alibaba both directly
curate content and also enable user curation.
Search — Search engines are a unique and critically distinct part
of the online ecosystem, influencing the ways in which their users
encounter content by algorithmically curating search results for
specific queries.
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App stores – App stores, like the Apple iOS App Store and the
Google Play Store, serve as both gateways to communities of
internet users as well as content-curators in their own right. In
addition to operating as file-hosting services that store mobile
application software files, which users download onto their
devices to then access content hosted elsewhere, app stores
create both technical and content-oriented rules that govern how
applications are posted to, maintained through, and removed
from their platforms.
Financially Facilitating: These are the plugins and services that
enable the processing of payments, an essential component of ecommerce and other fee-for-service interactions online. Well-known
examples include Alipay, M-Pesa, PayPal, Amazon Pay, Stripe, Square,
Visa, and MasterCard.
How these various subcomponents of the online information ecosystem interact at
any given time to produce and disseminate content is not static, and importantly,
these categories are not discrete. Single companies often act in a variety of functional
roles and thus have potential control over a variety of these functions. Google, for
example, operates across each of these areas. It builds fiber-optic internet cables
(access role); operates a registry, a registrar, and a recursive resolver (delivery role);
provides scaled cloud services (hosting and securing role); runs a digital wallet and
online payment system (financially facilitating role); offers an internet browser
(browsing role); manages an app store (app store role); and runs the dominant search
engine across the United States and Europe (content-curating role); all in addition to
its core business functions of advertising and data monetization.

A Deeper Dive: Levers of Control
Building on the basic mapping and case studies introduced above, the following
section explores in greater detail the functionality provided by each part of the
ecosystem, the corresponding mechanisms of content mediation available, and
further illustration of how these levers can be—and have been—utilized.

Accessing
The precursor to communicating online is accessing the internet. This requires
access to both the infrastructure layer—the actual cables, cellular system, routers,
switches, and other hardware via which the 0s and 1s that make up our digital
communications travel—and the logical layer—meaning the internet protocols that
computers use to route information in the digital world.44 As a practical matter, this
access is generally provided by Internet Service Providers (or “ISPs”). ISPs connect
individual users to the internet, enabling them to access and share content.45
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Just as ISPs can provide access, they can also turn off access—something that typically
happens in response to government mandates,46 though ISPs can act independently
as well, as they did in the 8chan case.47 These actions can be regional, or platformand service-specific.48 ISPs can cut access to services altogether, cut access to services
for a particular geographic area, or block particular content through techniques like
deep packet inspection (a form of opening up traffic and filtering for certain key
words or images) or blocking ranges of IP addresses. These firms can also take steps
to “throttle” access to content, or slow down its speed of transmission, which raises
the costs (temporally, sometimes also financially) for users to access internet content.
Virtual private networks (VPNs) can provide an alternative way for users to
connect—enabling users to mask their location and access internet content blocked
by local content controls imposed on their local ISPs through laws and regulations,
particularly intellectual property regimes. However, VPN companies can themselves
make decisions about what kinds of traffic to allow or disallow through their
encrypted connections—even if most allow users to access whatever content they
choose—and they can also be regulated by governments to prevent access to certain
kinds of content.

Browsing
Once users are connected to the internet on a technical level—with the requisite
hardware installed, and electronic signals flowing—users need to navigate the
internet in words and languages that they understand. Browsers are software
applications, installed on a user’s device, that enable users to initiate the process of
requesting and retrieving web content by typing a user-friendly domain name (URL)
into an address field—for example, www.american.edu. Certain devices might have
specific browsers pre-installed (e.g., Safari on Apple devices), but users are generally
able to install and use a variety of browsers to navigate to content.
Though often overlooked, browsers can and do determine what information is made
available to users online. Browsers can block access to particular webpages or
websites, both for technical reasons (such as the destination site not having HTTPS
enabled) as well as content-oriented ones. They can redirect users to different
websites, and they can also issue interstitial notices that appear before access is
granted. For example, when a user on Google Chrome attempts to visit a site known
to host malware, a warning is typically delivered while the browser intercepts and
stops the webpage from loading.49 These kinds of interstitial notices can operate as
warning signals that users have to click through; they can require entry and
certification of particular information, such as self-verification of age or parental
approval; or they can block access to the website altogether.

Delivering
For online traffic to get routed from one point to another, it needs to have a digital
address and a means of finding that address—a function the Domain Name System
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(DNS) performs. This is a multi-step process: First, the plain language web address
(e.g., facebook.com, worldwildlife.org, or whitehouse.gov) is translated into a unique
digital address (known as an IP address) by a recursive DNS nameserver, which
retrieves the relevant information and then sends it back to the initial requester.50
Notably, the DNS nameservers do not create or maintain this digital directory—they
merely serve as publishers, distributing it to the public. A range of private- and publicsector actors perform the role of creating and maintaining the directory. Registry
operators like Verisign (.COM and .NET), Nominet (UK), and Afnic (France) maintain
the top-level domains—the last part of the website address. Registrars like GoDaddy,
Squarespace, Bluehost, and Google Domains sell subsidiary domain names—what
goes to the left of the .com, .org, or .edu.51 There are also country-specific top level
domain names, called “ccTLDs,” such as .cn for Chinese websites, .de for German
websites, and .ir for Iranian websites.
The DNS is fertile ground for controlling what is and is not accessible online. 52 As
discussed above, Tucows, one of the world’s biggest domain registrars, suspended its
agreement with the parent company of 8chan in the wake of the 2019 El Paso
shooting.53 Without a registrar servicing a domain (in that case, 8chan.com), content
retrieval requests from users go unanswered, making the website inaccessible.
Similarly, GoDaddy and then Google stopped servicing the domain for the Daily
Stormer in the wake of its support for and disturbing commentary on the 2017
Charlottesville Unite the Right rally and terrorist attack.54 This past year, in an effort
to combat harmful content relating to the Covid-19 pandemic, a stakeholder group
representing major registrars around the world published a guide for “Registrar
approaches to the Covid-19 Crisis.”55
Content delivery network (CDN) services also play a critical role in scaling the delivery
of websites and other content to users. Generally speaking, CDNs consist of a
geographically distributed set of servers that accelerate the delivery of internet
content by holding cached content of a website (content stored locally so that new
requests can be filled faster). This protects against long delays in accessing requested
content; regionally staged CDNs can respond to local requests with relative speed.
CDNs can be a source of control independent of the security services that CDNs also
provide (described below). Before the Chinese government banned Google from
operating in China, the government blocked the Google cache.56 In 2020, Vietnam’s
state-owned telecommunications companies forced Facebook’s local Vietnamese
cache servers offline for a period of seven weeks.57 The connection was so slow as to
make Facebook effectively unavailable to many users. It was only after Facebook
negotiated with the government and agreed to a range of content take-down requests
that the domestic cache servers were allowed back online.58
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Hosting and securing
Content needs a home, because otherwise there will be nothing to route and deliver
upon request. This is where hosting services come in. Web hosting is enabled by
servers, or computers running programs designed to listen for and process incoming
internet requests.59 The most familiar website hosting is public. Subscribers pay for
website hosting via companies like DigitalOcean or one of the many cloud providers
like Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, or Microsoft Azure that publish websites
publicly for any internet user to access (though full access may then be conditioned
on subscriptions, membership, etc.).60
While not a distinct part of the technical architecture, DDoS mitigation services play
a key functional role in this part of the ecosystem by supporting hosting and delivery
functions. They ensure availability in the face of distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks on target servers, thereby ensuring the continued operation of websites,
messaging services, and digitally connected devices, among other parts of the
internet.61 Related service providers—like web hosts or CDNs—often bundle DDoS
mitigation services with their core services.
Content controls in this part of the internet ecosystem can take several forms.
Website hosts can block requesting IP addresses (or support plugins that do the
same). Hosts can also modify the content displayed to users depending on their
geographic location. For instance, a user could go to a federal website to learn about
a policy and then have the same website load state-specific information, tied to the
user’s location, as determined by the user’s IP address. Similarly, the host of a
streaming website, such as Amazon Web Services (which hosts Netflix), can ensure
that only regionally licensed videos are available, or otherwise geographically
segmented services are provided.62
DDoS mitigation services are equally critical to determining what is and is not
available online. The same fundamental infrastructure that enables content to be
hosted, routed, and delivered to users in response to legitimate requests for access is
vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors looking to deny users access to content.
This is what DDoS attacks do—flood a target device with traffic in order to overwhelm
that device and render it inaccessible by other users. Protections against such attacks,
therefore, also enable content availability on the internet. 8chan, for example, was
forced offline once Cloudflare stopped providing DDoS protections. 63 Absent DDoS
mitigation services, website hosts and others are at risk of being flooded by attackers,
or by normal use (the “slashdot effect”), ultimately rendering them inaccessible or
forcing them to shut down.

Content-curating
At the edge of this ecosystem are the open web and—likely the most discussed and
analyzed part of the ecosystem—the content curators. Content curators include
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search engine operators like Google and Microsoft (Bing); social platforms like
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Reddit, and TikTok; mobile app stores, such
as the Apple iOS App Store and Google’s Play Store; and a range of other entities that
support, rank, sort, and otherwise filter user-generated content. Some companies in
this space—such as Airbnb, Alibaba, Uber, and ebay!—curate content to connect
people in order to provide an offline service. Still others, such as online dating apps
and Eventbrite, connect people to people. A range of content disseminators serve
closed ecosystems of users; think, for example, of Dropbox. All of these actors are
user-interfacing, in that they directly interact with users online, employing different
models to aggregate or curate content for users to consume. They each play, as a
result, a key role in determining what content is and is not available to users online.
The tools available within this part of the online ecosystem are diverse, though there
are several key methods of moderation. Platforms that host user-generated
content—for example, social media platforms or online newspaper comment
sections—are typically able to target individual pieces of content for removal. These
removals are largely informed by “community standards” or similar terms of service.
More discreetly, many content curators regulate the degree of visibility of content
rather than removing it from a platform (or in the case of search engines, from the
internet). Google’s search algorithm, for example, exercises a significant amount of
control over which websites and thus which information each user sees in response
to a particular query. 64 Similarly, platforms like Facebook and YouTube use
algorithmic curation to suggest content that users might not otherwise encounter.65
Twitter’s introduction of flags and filters for misinformation relating to U.S. election
integrity and the Covid-19 pandemic previewed another set of tools that stop short of
actually removing potentially harmful content.66
Mobile app stores, such as the Apple iOS App Store and Google’s Play Store, play a
unique role in the ecosystem due to the widespread use of mobile applications, the
dominance of the two major app stores, and the fact that users’ choice of app store is
largely predetermined by their choice of mobile device. App stores serve as gateways
to online communities of users (e.g., of iPhones or Android devices) that rely on those
app store platforms to download approved applications to their devices. Once the
software files are downloaded from an app store, users run the applications on their
device to access content hosted (in most cases) by parties other than the app store
(e.g., the TikTok app connects to servers for tiktok.com which are hosted on cloud
services separate from Apple and Google).
App stores have levers of control over which applications are posted on their stores,
how applications are maintained through their stores (e.g., content policies, security
updates), and how applications are removed from their stores. These controls are
both technical and content-oriented; for example, while Parler’s return to Apple’s
App Store following its takedown in the wake of the January 6th attack on the Capitol
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seems to be contingent upon stricter moderation of hate speech, Parler will not filter
the same content for users accessing the platform by other means, such as browsers.67

Financially Facilitating
Underpinning many websites, mobile applications, and other key internet services
are financial services plugins that enable payment processing. These payment
plugins add features to websites and can be used across multiple different services.
They either manage payments directly within a website or redirect purchasers to
their respective third-party website (e.g., logging into PayPal in a second browser
window in order to pay for something in the first). Apple, Alipay, PayPal, Amazon
(Amazon Pay), Stripe, Square, Visa, and MasterCard all provide these payment
services. They protect website owners from having to worry about the technical and
regulatory difficulties of creating a secure online monetary transaction system.
Just as financial interactions are often required to access, publish or distribute
information in hard copy, financial interactions online can govern access to
information—as with subscription-based platforms—as well as facilitate or prevent
content consumers from supporting content creators on- or offline. Payment
processors can refuse—and at various times have refused—to support sellers that
are deemed objectionable. In 2010, for example, WikiLeaks was effectively “starved”
of 95% of its revenue after the U.S. government threatened reprisal against Julian
Assange and his website and pressured both U.S. and U.K. payment processors,
including Visa, MasterCard, and Moneybookers, to stop providing their services to
WikiLeaks.68 Similarly, copyright owners have long turned to payment processors to
“choke the flow of money to ‘pirate sites,’” eventually forcing the websites to shut
down. 69 In 2015, an ambitious sheriff in Cook County, Illinois, sought to choke
Backpage.com—an online classified ad forum that was widely known as a place to
hire sex workers—by demanding that credit card companies refuse payment for ads
on Backpage.70 Sex workers are frequently targeted in this way, having their accounts
suspended and funds frozen.71

Conclusion: A Wider Lens
From screen to screen, every piece of online content relies on the majority of the
internet ecosystem mapped above—a diverse network of companies providing
related, but distinct, functions that enable us to tweet, to blog, to comment on the
news, to view others’ content or to share our own. This same ecosystem also
empowers harmful actors to launch harassment campaigns, spread disinformation,
and exchange illegal and abusive material.
Each of the functions described above presents unique opportunities to regulate this
content as it moves through the online information ecosystem. Companies exercising
these various functions not only can but also, as illustrated, already do take action to
target specific content. These actions are not cost free. They often involve attendant
12

risks of collateral and disproportionate impacts. The consequences of allowing—or
even requiring—companies controlling core internet infrastructure (such as Internet
Service Providers) to moderate certain online content are vastly different from
allowing or requiring those on the edge of the ecosystem, such as content curators, to
do the same.
However, due at least in part to the lack of widespread attention paid to the functional
roles these companies play in disseminating content online, when these companies
have acted there have been few guiding norms or standards to reference. Content,
users, and even entire platforms have been denied services on a largely ad-hoc basis,
presenting significant speech- and security-related concerns while simultaneously
reducing the likelihood that these actions will have a meaningful long-term impact in
terms of effectively disrupting the dissemination of harmful content online. Widening
the lens of content moderation conversations to account for the full online
information ecosystem allows us to engage in more nuanced, comprehensive, and
thus hopefully more effective conversations about when, where, and how to most
effectively address the dissemination of harmful content online given the potential
collateral costs. We look forward to continuing these conversations in follow-on
reports.
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